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Abstract 
This paper sets out to understand how the dominant modes of resource 
control shifted following the inception of decentralisation reforms in Central 
Kalimantan. It argues that the formal mechanisms of public participation 
and representation bear little resemblance to the actual arrangements 
determining who gains access to resources. Here the ‘voice’ of influential 
actors focuses on participating in the distribution of benefits rather than the 
core policy-setting functions of local government. At least in this context, 
the normative model of how ‘good governance’ should occur remains 
remote from the practical realities of what can be achieved on the ground. 
In contrast, a policy intervention that builds on the logic guiding local 
governance systems might have more hope of improving the position of 
disadvantaged actors within shifting networks of accommodation and 
exchange. 
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Introduction 
Decentralisation, or regional autonomy, aims to shift the locus of 
government decision-making to a place ‘where civil society can work its 
magic better’ (Tendler 1997). The idea is that government responsiveness 
and accountability will improve if local government that is closer to and 
more accountable to local civil society takes decisions.1 The success of 
decentralisation has been seen to be largely contingent on the capacity of 
local constituents to hold decentralised authorities accountable for their 
actions. Put most simply, if accountability mechanisms are working 
effectively, constituents have the capacity to oversee political actors. For 
this to occur, overseeing actors need to have the capacity to sanction 
political actors if they disapprove (Ribot 2001). Effective accountability 
entails the establishment of some authoritative source of control by or for 
local populations (or ‘civil society’)—a capacity to hold local government 
accountable downwards. Consequently, decentralisation programs aim to 
increase the ability of local civil society to monitor and pressure local 
government.2 However, what happens when the analytical categories that 
the turn to civil society assumes and on which the prospect of successful 
decentralisation depends are absent? 
This paper examines how decentralisation and the subsequent 
recentralisation affected the exercise of public powers over nature in the 
local domain in Central Kalimantan to advance a number of arguments. 
First, the turn to and away from decentralisation in Indonesia over 1998–
2004 involved a struggle over resources that reveals a particular trajectory 
of politico-legal change. In common with other areas subject to 
decentralisation reforms, elites undoubtedly benefited disproportionately in 
the course of these struggles. Yet, rather than seeing this as another case 
of ‘elite capture’, this article argues that these changes can more readily be 
understood in terms of a swing between two well established modes of 
resource control that are both connected and competing. Before 
decentralisation, localised or ‘decentralised’ modes of exchange and 
accommodation were well established but less salient.3 During the high 
season of regional autonomy these modes became more autonomous of 
the previously dominant centralised mode of resource control. As these 
decentralised modes flourished, rents were more widely distributed. While 
this allowed a wider range of strategically situated local actors to benefit, 
due to the structural disadvantages they faced, poor rural actors only 
gained short term and limited benefits. Over time the older system became 
more apparent: as corporate interests adjusted, they incorporated district 
elites and administrative structures as well as key rural actors into their 
processes of resource access. Just as colonial regimes inevitably 
incorporated local elites, predominant economic interests found ways to 
cooperate with and incorporate local strongmen, administrative and village 
elites emboldened by the changes. In this way the decentralised modes of 
resource extraction, which have received so much bad press, articulated 
with still dominant (but largely ignored) centralised modes.  
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Second, the literature suggests that democratic decentralisation requires 
for its success a civil society capable of holding the state agencies that have 
gained devolved powers downwardly accountable. This provides a 
conceptual framework for those aspiring to channel and order popular 
demands on the state. Critics have noted difficulty in universalising the 
concept of decentralisation, as founded in modern Western Europe, and its 
application to political developments elsewhere. In Central Kalimantan, 
power is localised and often naked in its expression. In the past the state 
system in Central Kalimantan had a quite predatory character. Even under a 
decentralised system, remote and impoverished communities still faced 
significant obstacles to holding district administrations accountable or 
participating in policy making. In the absence of formal modes of 
accountability, taxes extracted from local resources have tended to be 
channeled away from service delivery and other conventional state activities 
into clientelist systems of exchange and distribution. Consequently, the key 
protagonists of modern associational life have focused on extracting a share 
of resources. While this ensures that resources are more widely distributed, 
the system remains distant from normative models of good governance. In 
contrast, the policy discourse regarding decentralisation requires the 
existence of a healthy civil society. However, in remote places like Central 
Kalimantan this policy narrative sets itself up for disappointment. 
Theoretically and practically, a better understanding of the assumptions 
guiding existing systems of resource control would increase the likelihood of 
finding interventions that might increase the bargaining position of 
disadvantaged actors within persistent, localised modes of exchange and 
accommodation. 
To understand the impact of regional autonomy on patterns of resource 
use, the concept of access is central. Access has been defined as the ability 
to derive benefits from natural resources (cf. Ribot 1998: 308). As actors 
struggle to benefit from the productive use of natural resources, they make 
use of a range of social, economic, and legal mechanisms. In particular, 
legal frameworks, institutional power, group membership, social or ethnic 
identity, social status, dynamics within a resource-controlling group, as well 
as access to the state, capital, material resources, customary authority, 
markets, knowledge and the ability to use institutional mechanisms are all 
factors that affect the process of gaining access to resources (Berry 1989; 
Ribot 1998; Ribot and Peluso 2002). The main point is not whether access 
is considered legal, extralegal, legitimate or illegitimate according to various 
normative views (Ribot 1998) but rather depends on an actor’s ability to 
dominate or influence other actors. Patterns of resource access can 
ultimately be understood in terms of how power is allocated and exercised 
within a society (cf. Berry 1989).  
This article analyses how regional autonomy in Central Kalimantan has 
affected relations of power, encompassing both the legal and de facto loci 
of control. As such, it documents: first, the changing prescriptions of law 
regarding property, permits, licenses, titles and official structures of 
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authority; and second, the changes to the whole ensemble of mechanisms 
shaping access—‘the structural and relational forces’—that exist ‘prior and 
parallel to’ socially recognised rules (Ribot 1998). Consequently, we need to 
understand how the change associated with decentralisation or regional 
autonomy has affected the structure of political, economic and legal 
relations that govern conditions of access. As dominant discourses and the 
structures of power change, institutionalised mechanisms governing 
resource access adjust. When the existing institutional arrangements and 
social relations restructure, new nodes of identity and action are created, 
and new categories of people may rise to pre-eminence (cf. Berry 1989: 
43–4). Yet, such a structural analysis needs to be supplemented by an 
actor-oriented approach, because, within the changing patterns of political 
representation, participation, and power under regional autonomy, actors 
take up new strategies. As they attempt to shape conditions for their own 
ends, this in turn affects patterns of access and use.  
This article proceeds in three sections. First, I will briefly consider the 
period immediately before regional autonomy before discussing, second, 
the high water mark of autonomy (2000–02), before finally tracing 
developments from 2002.  
The Late New Order 
The New Order system of governance that operated before regional 
autonomy has been analysed in terms of horizontal and vertically integrated 
networks of power and interest largely financed with extralegal revenues, 
including those derived from the timber sector.4 Under this system powerful 
politico-bureaucrats pursued entrepreneurial activities and extracted rents 
where possible, either for self enrichment, to command the loyalty of others 
both within and outside the pecking orders, and/or to sustain the political 
interests of the institutions in which they were embedded.  
This was particularly apparent in the forestry sector where an apparently 
centralised state system controlled access to resources. Under the Basic 
Forestry Act (No. 5/1967) the State—viz the Ministry of Forestry and its line 
agencies—controlled access to benefits via a concession licensing system 
(McCarthy 2000). As is well known, actors with access to key decision 
makers within the regime, such as top military officials or cronies of the 
president, obtained legal timber concession permits (HPH) (Barr 1998). 
Given the close relations between the politico-bureaucrats controlling 
access and the corporate actors mining the forests, the legal strictures 
pertaining to state control over forest access remained primary to obtaining 
access during field operations. In parallel with these legal rules there 
existed a well established but unwritten set of rules regarding how the 
benefits of resource access were divided in obtaining licenses and permits, 
working forest areas, transporting logs downriver, and exporting timber 
overseas; similar to that described by Harriss–White (2003).  
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During this time Central Kalimantan became the ‘kitchen’ of the 
concession system; as described by a local academic. In opening the area 
to exploitation, a state forest mapping exercise (TGHK) classified 75 per 
cent of the province’s surface area (20.2 million hectares) as ‘national forest 
estate’ and some nine million hectares of this area as ‘production forest’. 
The Ministry of Forestry granted 108, 20-year concessions to exploit these 
areas, disregarding indigenous property rights. According to one estimate, 
concessions operating in these areas supplied 40 per cent of the annual 
national log supply.5  
Common practice during this time was for companies holding timber 
exploitation licenses to pay the cost of processing licenses and permits as 
well as formal taxes and duties on legal timber. Then, even after meeting 
these requirements, they still faced the expense of making well established 
payments to police, military, forestry and local government officials whose 
concurrence was needed for smooth operations in the field and for 
transport of timber to market along the river. In order to maximise profits, 
timber operators sought to reduce formal taxes and duties paid as well as 
the cost of obtaining permits. They did this by extracting timber in excess 
of their legal quotas and expanding operations to areas adjacent to their 
permit areas. As a result they transported timber downriver well in excess 
of the amount for which they had legal documents. 
Under the concession system, companies with official HPH concession 
licenses along the Barito River usually ran integrated operations that 
encompassed logging large areas, transporting timber downriver, and 
exporting sawn timber or plywood. However, these actors holding 
concession licenses also subcontracted various functions to other operators. 
In parallel with the vertically integrated concession system, other actors 
sold their services to concessionaires, who provided shipment of timber 
downriver. According to sources involved in these shipping operations, if 
the concessionaire had full documents for a shipment, they would use 
company barges (tonggkang). However, if the shipment lacked full 
documentation they would engage the services of what had become known 
as expedisi; a subcontractor to ship the timber downriver. On average, 
expedisi would only obtain permits for approximately 30 per cent of the 
timber they transported. Given the significant taxes thereby avoided, ample 
funds were left over to make the payments required to navigate the 
informal system.6
In parallel with the institutional order working down from Jakarta, as I 
described elsewhere (McCarthy 2006), during the New Order, a system of 
primary institutional arrangements characterised the resource extraction 
that operated in Indonesia’s outer islands. These self regulating networks of 
exchange and accommodation determined access to and use of key local 
resources, refracting state policy and laws. The logic of this system is clear: 
over long periods of time state decision makers in distant Jakarta had 
developed nation wide organisational rules pertaining to the local domain—
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specifically in areas of state forest. Yet, these rules failed to accommodate 
the interests of diverse actors and the variety of situations found in the 
local area. These included the extra budgetary needs of local political actors 
and officials to maintain the local state apparatus, sustain political loyalties, 
and meet personal economic ambitions. Also the state order failed to meet 
the ambitions of local entrepreneurs disadvantaged by regulations that 
privileged those able to obtain forest exploitation permits in distant Jakarta, 
as well as provide labour and economic opportunities for villagers 
disadvantaged by a state concessions system that allowed unjust and 
inequitable logging of customary lands. 
Under the localised system of resource extraction that emerged, local 
entrepreneurs operated quasi legal timber operations, sometimes in 
cooperation with outside concessionaires. They could do so as long as they 
conformed to a system of reciprocities that involved extra legal gifts, 
payments and political support and other exchanges with key local 
politicians and state functionaries. These systems of extraction worked 
under the blind eye of local officials who were otherwise loyal to the 
regime. As they evolved, they grew into encompassing webs of exchange 
and accommodation that included forestry staff, army personnel and other 
key local functionaries while reaching out into the wider society to 
encompass village and customary leaders (adat). In many cases the local 
bosses with access to capital and contacts and kinship relations within state 
agencies, worked with the agents of centralised concession operators, local 
police and military officials, playing key roles within these institutional 
arrangements. While state legal sanctions would not be applied against 
those conforming to the reciprocities regulating this system, the state legal 
domain and those empowered by it remained central to the system. 
Officials within these networks derived power from their capacity to use 
discretionary powers over permits, to enforce state regulations and to apply 
state sanctions. Within complex evolving situations, the institutional 
arrangements governing access to resources both reflected and refracted 
customary local notions of rights, clientelist patterns of exchange and 
accommodation, and state laws within an institutional matrix working in an 
overlapping, and complicated fashion across these three institutional orders 
(McCarthy 2006).  
With the police under the armed forces, the military was a leading 
agency in these processes. According to one source, the head of the 
Regional Military Commander (danrem) appointed lower Military District 
Commanders (kodim), taking into account their promises regarding the 
amount they would ‘store’ upwards to the military command. This was just 
one of the unofficial ways the military financed their existence. In Central 
Kalimantan under this system, well before regional autonomy, well 
connected entrepreneurs and local timber interests at the district level 
found a place in the interstices of New Order state. 
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Regional Autonomy 
Even before the key autonomy law (UU 22/1999) came into force, district 
governments had gained greater legal authority in the forestry sector, for 
example, gaining power to grant small scale logging licenses.7 In addition to 
such formal powers, under regional autonomy, districts set up district 
forestry offices (dinas) that were accountable only to the district head and 
these now operated according to new district regulations (perda) rather 
than the directives of the Ministry of Forestry in distant Jakarta. These 
formal changes, combined with the discretionary powers gained by district 
administrations following regional autonomy, meant that districts gained a 
large degree of de facto control over the way resource policy worked in 
their districts. From 1999, district administrations in Central Kalimantan, 
began to issue timber licenses to local people operating in their own name 
or that of a community group incorporated into a cooperative or ‘farming 
group’. District entrepreneurs also began to formalise their operations by 
obtaining more extensive licenses for timber mills, which had until then 
worked outside the law to various degrees.8
Under this system, the forestry department lost its capacity to operate as 
a vertically integrated agency with full technical responsibility for forests. As 
such, regional autonomy entailed a significant change in the locus where 
those wishing to gain access had to invest, pay a fee or exchange a service, 
in order to gain access. To the mortification of the Ministry of Forestry, 
after 1999, it became more effective than ever to secure access within the 
district domain, and district officials became important gatekeepers 
governing access to forest resources found in their district.9
Yet, many permits could still be obtained from provincial and central 
government agencies, indicating how decentralisation led to the 
diversification of control over access to forest areas and access to market. 
Competition intensified between different agencies and levels of 
government as well as between actors who had invested in relationships at 
a particular level to control access.10 Consequently, the state was less able 
to maintain the pretence of operating as a unitary actor and now, more 
than ever, it emerged in a plural guise (McCarthy 2004). 
In Central Kalimantan the New Order had a rather predatory character, 
extracting large rents from the province’s forests, despoiling the patrimony 
of the indigenous people while providing very little in way of collective 
goods, especially in remote rural hamlets. Now, with the demise of 
Jakarta’s authority in law and public discourse, repressed grievances came 
to the fore. Local Dayak identity discourses and territorial modes of 
resource control became important as rural people and district elites alike 
openly challenged the mining of the forests by outside actors. Such factors 
as group membership, as well as social and ethnic identity became more 
important in determining who could legitimately gain access to resources in 
the local domain. In villages across the province anger boiled to the surface 
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at the way outside interests had over ridden adat property rights, the role 
of immigrants in extractive industries, and the minimal benefits enjoyed by 
local people (ICG 2001; McCarthy 2001a, 2001b). In numerous disputes 
those claiming adat rights in particular exerted physical control over 
surrounding areas. Hereafter, this Dayak identity discourse worked against 
outsiders exploiting resources subject to adat claims. Villagers asserted adat 
claims over local resources via demonstrations, blockades, and threatened 
physical violence. As there was a significant change in the legitimacy and 
enforceability of adat rights, villagers asserted physical control over access 
to resources in areas around their villages, swiddens and forest gardens.  
At the same time, beyond the territorial rights of villages, indigenous 
Dayak businessmen, politicians and officials expected that Dayak to win 
favourable positions and opportunities and that their region should advance 
materially and socially from mining the province’s resources. Local elites 
railed against the way outsiders with connections in Jakarta, or with the 
military, dominated the timber and mining sector; overstepping the local 
administration in gaining permits. Grievances also focused the lucrative 
nature of resource extraction that occurred without adequate funding for 
the development of local infrastructure, while also denying local 
entrepreneurs to gain sufficient benefits from resource extraction in ‘their 
area’. Antipathy against outsiders holding key positions within the local 
bureaucracy translated into moves to indigenise key positions in the 
bureaucracy. This Dayak identity discourse built on local resentments to 
legitimise decisions that were seen to favour local Dayak.11 
Those Dayak identities close to officials or with the means of winning 
their favour gained a new prominence, using kinship, village or other 
contacts in the administration, exchanging favours and offering monies to 
obtain permits for small scale exploitation, transport and sawmill licenses. 
District regulations and policies explicitly or implicitly favoured people with 
local Dayak identity by granting formal exploitation permits (McCarthy 
2001a, 2001b).12 If these brokers and small scale entrepreneurs could help 
villagers to incorporate as cooperatives or enlist their names on permit 
applications, they could process small scale timber concessions in the name 
of village collectives.  
With the explosion of resentment and demands by villagers upriver 
against conglomerates, a large number of disputes emerged between 
concessionaires and villagers. As concessionaires and outside financiers 
faced increased threats from local actors, timber conglomerates found they 
needed to renegotiate how they gained access to resources. At least 
formally, they could still obtain permits in the old way, but it was no longer 
sufficient to just obtain exploitation licenses via the central government. 
Having gained more extensive powers under regional autonomy, assertive 
district heads began to issue short term exploitation permits to local 
interests inside concession areas, typically favouring Dayak with kinship 
affiliations, from the same area, or with political or economic ties.  
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In this context district heads could put pressure on conglomerates to 
negotiate access via district administrations. In Central Kalimantan, 
concessionaires working with local businessmen began to invest in other 
extraction strategies. Conglomerates worked with local businessmen and 
brokers, with informal support from the Buapti and Governor, extending the 
system that had operated during the earlier period.13 For example, Djajanti, 
one of largest timber conglomerates in Central Kalimantan, allowed local 
companies to harvest its concession areas, according to one of its 
commissioners, ‘on the condition they only sell to us’. ‘We worked out what 
our costs would have been if we had been working the areas ourselves. 
And that’s what we’ve paid the companies now working our concessions,’ 
said Sudrajat. Sudrajat decided to take this course of action because it 
seemed more advantageous than having to strong arm it with the regent. 
With their current powers, it is very difficult to get the regents to back 
down.14
These conglomerates also needed to negotiate taxation and levies—
formal or otherwise—imposed by local government.15 The system had the 
virtue of raising significant district taxes (PAD) for local government. Also, 
given the corruption and collusion within the system, it enriched those 
occupying positions in the district administration. 
As well as working to incorporate district elites and administrative 
structures into their processes of resource access, entrepreneurs and 
outside companies also sought to integrate key rural actors. For instance, 
they preferred to operate through a villager, a local cooperative registered 
with the district government, or community group who could obtain 
operating permits from district government. By operating behind a person 
or group with a local identity, outside actors could more readily legitimise 
their operations. This also had an added advantage: with many villagers 
recruited into timber operations in diverse ways, the benefits tended to 
dissipate emergent ‘vertical’ conflicts. Conflicts between companies and 
villagers were often transmuted into conflicts between villagers engaged in 
cutting timber in their adat territories and those who felt left out.16  
The system offered added economic advantages. Government agencies 
found it difficult to effectively tax informal logging operations without an 
office and those not formally registered as a company. While many local 
operators might be able to obtain documents that enabled them to 
transport timber within the district, they lacked the documentation 
necessary to market the timber outside the area. Timber without full legal 
status had a lower price. Conglomerates that had production permits 
obtained from the central government could buy this timber cheaply from 
poor villagers, and using their permits, render it legal, and thereby make 
considerable profits. Further, given that many concessionaries had over 
harvested their concession areas, they now faced difficulties meeting 
production targets.17 Concessionaires avoided the appearance of operating 
illegally by subcontracting village teams to log surrounding areas, accessing 
8 
other sources of timber subject to adat rights, and co-opt villagers. 
Consequently, villagers remained in a weak position after regional 
autonomy. Even if they could muster the money to obtain forest 
exploitation permits from the district government, village actors and small 
time brokers were unable to afford or market timber beyond the local 
domain. They often lacked the capital required to use heavy machinery, run 
a sawmill, or obtain the permits required to transport the timber to market. 
Villagers might log areas under exploitation permits granted by district 
administrations in the name of individuals or cooperatives set up in the 
name of community groups. Yet, this logging took place for brokers 
financed from outside, or on behalf of concessionaires. Even following 
decentralisation, those with control over capital and permits accrued the 
largest share of the profits as a result of taking timber through key nodes in 
the commodity chain where value was added to the timber (Zerner 2000).  
We can see these changes affecting the operation of the expedisi 
discussed earlier. By 2000, the Barito River had also become an insecure 
place: with up to 30 gangs of river pirates operating along the river, timber 
shipments faced significant risk of hijacking. At the same time government 
agencies were competing more extensively to extract benefits from the 
system. By 2004, there were 480 official posts from Puruk Cauh down to 
Banjarmasin. These posts were operated by a variety of state agencies 
including: District Police Commands (Polsek); subdistrict Military Commands 
(Koramil); forestry and local government revenue collection agencies 
(dispenda); marine and port police; as well the navy and villagers who 
levied ‘taxes’ on passing shipments of timber.18 Faced with an uncertain 
business environment, these interests found it easier to get existing local 
strongmen to organise operations upriver. In this situation, timber 
companies used expedisi more extensively guaranteeing the arrival of 
timber downstream. Fundamentally this involved sharing profits to minimise 
risks.  
The actors running these operations required considerable skills and 
audacity with the amount of profit depending on how they handled these 
risks. This encompassed arranging all the payments and negotiations with 
the various administrative areas found along the river. The amount involved 
was not trivial: an expedisi might provide hundreds of millions of rupiah to 
the head of the security forces in a riverside district each time the expedisi 
passed.19 The reasons for this were clear: law enforcement authorities who 
felt affronted by the level of payment had the capacity to seize a shipment 
or arrest the expedisi leader. District government leaders also derived large 
profits from expedisi. As they also could order an expedisi to be held up or 
let go, expedisi could not proceed without the agreement of the district 
government executive. Moreover, if the timber was confiscated, district 
heads could arrange for it to be processed according to the legal fiction that 
it had no owner and ‘auction’ it back to the expedisi.20 Alternatively, as a 
shipment could be lost to hijackers or fall prey to an extortion racket run by 
a rival port underworld gang, payments were required to rival armed thugs 
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(preman) working the river. On occasion disputes led to casualties, if for 
instance the preman protecting a shipment became involved in a shoot out 
with river pirates or the police and they engaged in a gun battle.  
Given their capacity to bridge this crucial space in the commodity chain, 
expedisi accumulated large amount of capital. By 2002, in addition to 
working for concessionaires and Banjarmasin based timber mills, expedisi 
carried timber for freelance brokers who went upriver to place orders. 
Further, expedisi worked as entrepreneurs in their own right, overseeing 
timber operations upriver and taking timber from scores of local timber 
brokers. At the peak of the expedisi system, shipments could be over three 
kilometres in length.21  
The risks involved in the system meant that only the strongest expedisi 
could survive. In 1995, according to one source, there were approximately 
six actors working as expedisi. By 2002, only four key figures straddled the 
link between local timber operators and buyers upriver and the market 
downriver in Banjarmasin, thereby becoming the key players in the forest 
sector for this area. As this process of ‘natural selection’ proceeded, in 2004 
only two continued to work the river. 
Power, Accountability and Civil Society under Regional Autonomy 
There are further issues to consider with respect to this system, the first of 
which concerns the nature of power in this out-of-the-way and long 
neglected province. Under regional autonomy the local administration had 
gained authority over licenses and permits, while the police retained power 
to enforce the law. At the same time, entrepreneurs, brokers and agents of 
Jakarta based conglomerates maintained a hold over productive processes 
through their control over capital and access to outside markets. While a 
range of accommodations and exchanges between actors oiled the wheels 
of this system, these arrangements extended way beyond simple 
transactions between the actors involved. If the system was to continue to 
operate with such a high degree of corruption and illegality, it needed to 
protect itself from unwanted scrutiny. Exposure outside the province could 
lead to law enforcement activities from external actors, or the demand for 
payments in exchange for turning a blind eye. With a national campaign 
against illegal logging, those with most to lose from exposing their 
operations were prepared to intimidate or take violent action against actors 
who might expose it. For instance, a Non Governmental Organisation (NGO) 
activist described how some of these thugs had tried to kill him by running 
his motorcycle off a remote road into some trees. Consequently, power is 
often naked in its expression in Central Kalimantan. 
If democratic decentralisation is about devolving powers to downwardly 
accountable actors (cf. Agrawal and Ribot 1999), we can understand 
outcomes in terms of the way accountability relations encompass local 
government. Indeed, the main mechanisms of accountability set out in 
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Laws 22/1999 and 25/1999 operated primarily through elected district 
assemblies (DPRD) with the capacity to hold executive accountable.22 The 
underpinning assumption seems to have been that the legislative would use 
mechanisms at its disposal to police and punish government officials—
including the head of the region—that misbehaved. But, with only a weak 
link between people and DPRD members through a poorly designed 
electoral system, members of the DPRD only represented constituents living 
in remote areas in the weakest of senses.  
Disaffected DPRD members described the collusion between elected 
representatives and the district heads as causing problems that become 
apparent at two key time during the year, namely: with annual 
accountability reporting and budgetary arrangements. Before the revision of 
the key decentralization law (UU 22/1999), Indonesia’s decentralisation 
laws provided the DPRD with the power to reject the annual accountability 
reports to enhance the monitoring of executive behaviour and hence 
improve government performance.23 In theory, if this report is not 
accepted, the district head can be forced to resign. According to a number 
of accounts from Central Kalimantan, the district heads pay money to 
members of DPRD to ensure the acceptance of their accountability report. 
Within the system of exchange that dominates district politics, the 
accountability report becomes a lever to extract business and other 
concessions from a district head, with DPRD members refusing to pass 
reports until agreement is reached regarding how district projects will be 
allocated.24 Expensive deal making also affects the arrangement of the 
annual budget. In particular, the heads of the district assemblies, agencies, 
factions in the DPRD, the district head, and secretaries of the district, are 
the major players in arranging the budget (RAPBD), obtaining projects 
worth millions of rupiah. In return for their acquiescence, DPRD members 
obtain projects and sums of money allocated ‘for lobbying’.25
According to a disillusioned DPRD member interviewed in 2004, a career 
in the DPRD has become an object of accumulation both for personal and 
political ends. Candidates for the legislature need to invest in the party to 
become a candidate, and once a candidate is elected they need to earn 
money for the party to support re-election.26 To this end, they need to 
obtain lots of projects. Consequently, he said, ‘people are very disillusioned 
with politicians, they just see them as being after their own interests’. Given 
the dominant power of the executive in policy processes and the way 
collusive practices have corrupted the DPRD, community aspirations fail to 
be taken up by DPRD. It is hardly surprising that villagers have few 
expectations and, according to one DPRD member, they are not interested 
in meeting DPRD members visiting their constituencies.27  
Members of the DPRD have also been involved in the timber trade, using 
their status within networks of exchange and accommodation 
encompassing the executive to provide operations with a degree of 
immunity from the law. DPRD members have provided recommendations 
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for timber to pass through their districts or supported the statements of 
timber interests in the name of the DPRD. More directly, it has been 
estimated that more than 60 DPRD members in Central Kalimantan have 
been directly involved in timber enterprises.28  
This clearly demonstrates the degree to which villagers remained 
disadvantaged under decentralisation. Yet, the system that flourished at 
this time led to a much wider distribution of benefits than the earlier 
centralised system. Ironically, this wider distribution of benefits also 
encompassed the key agents of what is often considered civil society. This 
became apparent when a reporter noted that virtually all journalists in the 
provincial capital, Palangkaraya, received monthly payments from a major 
timber mill not to report on their activities. When villagers burnt down the 
mill after a prolonged festering dispute, the local press had failed to carry 
the story.29 Others described how freelance journalists travel around with a 
press card uncovering illegalities and extracting blackmail money in 
exchange for suppressing publication. According to one report, a timber 
operator could face 40 journalists visiting his office, asking for Rp100–200 
000 in exchange for not exposing illegalities. In a district along the Barito 
River, each time an expedisi passed, they would be given a list of the 
names of journalists needing payment (between Rp500 000–5 000 000) to 
withhold reports.30  
District officials and journalists also discussed similar phenomena among 
NGOs, which they jokingly referred to as ‘organisations that like to make 
requests’ (Lembaga Suka Minta or LSM); a wordplay on the Indonesian 
term for NGOs. With hundreds of NGOs emerging after the end of the New 
Order period, many NGOs in the province also collected information in 
upriver areas, extracting money from those involved in exchange for 
silence.31 According to a DPRD member, every time an illegal timber 
shipment passed along the Barito River, in Buntok, several NGOs received a 
payment. 
NGOs and the press may be considered the key protagonists of modern 
associational life. According to the classical idea of civil society conceived by 
its original historical exponents, they should act as the torch bearers of ‘a 
moral community, a legitimate political order’, (Khilnani 2001). Yet, on first 
appearances many of these key actors in civil society seemed to be acting 
like just another group of rent seekers. With journalists and NGOs taking 
payments from commercial interests, it was hard to envisage the press 
taking on a critical role. There were also obstacles to the healthy 
development of what Habemas has called a ‘public sphere’—where public 
opinion formed through free discussion in the press, informs and controls 
the activities of the state.32
The conventional account of the emergence of civil society in Europe 
describes how the mercantile class played a key role in the emergence of 
democracy in Europe by acting as a popular force to restrict state power. 
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The underpinning assumption is that with the rise of capitalist mercantile 
enterprises, capitalist classes followed an anti-absolutist political strategy, 
siding with popular forces instead of an oppressive state, and supporting 
restrictions on state power. In contrast to this account, in Central 
Kalimantan, the entrepreneurs and brokers which we might expect to 
function like incipient capitalists, seemed to be busy making backroom 
arrangements with agents of local state agencies rather than attempting to 
curb the arbitrary excesses of local state power (cf. Kaviraj 2001: 297).  
Yet, we need to understand the logic of this system from a different 
angle. As noted earlier, predatory state arrangements in Central 
Kalimantan’s timber sector were well established before decentralisation 
and were merely rearranged after its implementation. Even after 
decentralisation the formal mechanisms of public participation and 
representation were remote from the actual mechanisms determining who 
gained access to resources and how they did so. Actors, including those 
who should act like ‘the protagonists of civil society’, had a sense of 
entitlement—enabling local people to benefit from local resources. Yet, 
given the prevailing political conditions in Central Kalimantan, citizens 
lacked effective control over politics and the bureaucracy. They had 
expectations of participating in the core policy-setting functions of local 
government but in reality they had very little voice. This extended to a lack 
of control over the way taxation revenues generated from the region’s 
resources were raised and distributed. Given the way benefits from the 
timber sector were distributed, these actors could hardly expect taxes 
generated from local natural resources to improve public services or provide 
public services in any formal way. These conditions provided an 
environment for corrupt practices.33 While actors could not control it, they 
could participate in the system for distributing benefits. And if a sufficient 
number of influential actors in the areas through which shipments passed 
participated in this way, this system could obtain a degree of normative 
‘legitimacy’ because enough influential people tacitly participated in it. 
Meanwhile those who might dissent risked moving beyond the boundaries 
of local sociability or even placing themselves in danger. Consequently, 
actors were more likely to express their voice by forcing the system to 
include them in the distribution of benefits rather than whistleblowing.  
Post Autonomy: Changes after 2002  
From 2000 changes occurred that were to have far reaching consequences. 
In July 2000 Abdurahman Wahid separated the police from the armed 
forces (ICG 2001).34 Prior to the restructuring of the military, the military 
and police were integrated into a unitary command structure. As the 
military was the lead agency, ‘the police could be leant on by the military, 
and so they weren’t so brave’.35 After the reforms, the police reported 
directly to the president under a national civilian police chief. As the head of 
the provincial police now had a rank of brigadier general, the head of the 
local military command remained a colonel; the local police commander also 
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had a higher rank. Yet, like the military, the police remained under funded 
and, according to one report, obtained only 30 per cent of their operating 
budget from the government. At the same time the central government 
made no steps to improve accountability within the force. Despite regional 
autonomy, there were no formal means of holding police downwardly 
accountable to the local population.36 The provincial police chief remained 
upwardly accountable to the central government and the governor; the 
central representative of the regions. Consequently, as long as the 
provincial police chief tied up decisions with the governor, the police could 
operate outside the control of the district administration.37  
After 2002, making use of their new powers, the police began to work 
more autonomously of district civil and military commands. Forestry 
agencies had long competed with the police to control law enforcement in 
the forestry sector. While forestry officials had investigatory powers, they 
needed to report infringements of forestry law to the police whose 
responsibility it was to process the case until it reached court. Armed with 
extended authority, the police now increasingly confiscated timber without 
involving district forestry agencies. This left the district administration 
primarily in control of permits and licenses and there was little district 
administrations could do. 
In 2001 the new Megawati administration moved to reassert vertical 
control in remote provinces. In July 2002 the central government issued a 
new government regulation (PP 34/2002).38 Prior to this there were serious 
disputes within the districts and between the central and provincial 
authorities over natural resource decision-making. At this time, the Forestry 
Ministry regained control over the permit system, timber transport licences, 
and the collection of taxes on forestry activities, effectively rescinding 
district authority to issue 100 ha exploitation permits and raise district taxes 
in the sector.  
During this time, the police began to enforce laws that made for 
excellent public consumption as it coincided with a national campaign 
against illegal logging. In particular, police concentrated raids on smaller 
scale sawmills and timber shipments run by local entrepreneurs and 
brokers, as well as larger timber operations and some expedisi operating 
without legal documents. District officials were faced with arrest by the 
police for breaking national law. In a well known case in 2003, the head of 
the forestry agency, the district head, and the head of the DPRD in Barito 
Utara all faced legal charges for providing transportation documents to an 
expedisi containing uncertified timber. They allegedly issued the documents 
according to a district decision in contradiction of national forestry laws that 
require timber without documents to be confiscated and auctioned. 
Provincial rumour held it that the case involved political competition and 
unhappiness regarding the division of revenues with other actors.39  
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Despite this apparent crackdown, according to one forestry official on 
the Barito River, ‘if timber passes through with the flag of the police chief 
on it, no one is brave enough to touch it. Police can arrest us …but we can’t 
do anything to them.40 According to a number of sources, a broker close to 
the provincial police chief operated as the key gatekeeper in the province. 
Only timber syndicates making payments and linked to this broker had the 
informal blessing of the provincial police chief and could continue to 
operate. This led to a further round of natural selection, where actors 
lacking an excellent working relationship with this gatekeeper, or failing 
either to make speedy or adequate payments, faced legal sanctions.41
These practices led to several changes in the field. Before, with 
competition between the police and the forestry agencies, law enforcement 
remained somewhat unpredictable. But now, the extraction of timber 
became easier and more predictable for the few syndicates that now were 
able to operate. Second, the district bureaucracy could no longer guarantee 
access to resources in the same way. With small scale timber licenses 
expiring, many small scale district operators found that they could no 
longer negotiate new permits. Third, after PP 34, in a similar fashion as 
before regional autonomy, permits needed to be processed at the provincial 
level and in Jakarta.42 This increased the dependence of local operators on 
actors who could process permits—such as HPH concessionaires with valid 
licences—or guarantee taking timber out. Fourth, as districts could no 
longer apply district regulations, a number of administrative practices for 
raising district revenues and laundering timber could no longer be used. 
Accordingly, district revenue from the forest sector fell into decline. And so 
the high tide of regional autonomy in the forestry sector ebbed. 
Conclusions 
To sum up, despite shifts in the system, there appeared to be a great deal 
of continuity in modes of resource access and control. The localised modes 
of resource control—that were apparent during the New Order period—had 
become more explicit after decentralisation. In a sense, political 
decentralisation merely rearranged these already existing decentralised 
ways of organising production and allowed them to flourish. With regional 
autonomy, routes of access became more diverse. This allowed larger 
groups of actors to gain access to forest resources and enjoy benefits. As 
under the authoritarian New Order, the decentralised regime generated 
revenue and other benefits for political and other reasons while ignoring the 
ecological limits of Central Kalimantan’s once great forests. From 2000, the 
pendulum began to swing back towards centralised modes of resource 
control: by 2004 the mechanisms governing access to timber were back 
under the control of provincially integrated syndicates. Viewing the shift to 
regional autonomy as yet another case of elite capture is rather one-
dimensional: these changes can more readily be understood in terms of a 
swing between centralised and decentralised modes of resource control. 
These modes are not separate, but can be seen as connected and 
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competing, each working to the relative advance of a particular group of 
actors.  
Yet, appearances can be somewhat misleading. While the system proved 
to be very adaptive, only some actors could survive the continuous shifts in 
the system. Over the 1998–2004 period actors faced a very fluid situation. 
Entrepreneurs, brokers, license holders and sawmill owners who had risen 
to prominence during the New Order period had to ride successive waves of 
legal, economic and personnel changes if they were to continue to prosper. 
Successive changes in politics, economics and laws, the restructuring of the 
district and provincial agencies, changes in agency leadership, and the 
creation of new districts meant that there was a high degree of mobility in 
the public sector and changes in the authority and relative power of 
military, forestry, district and police agencies. Within this process of natural 
selection only the strongest and most capable figures could survive. These 
actors could adjust, using their multiple assets to insulate themselves from 
any particular change in the legal-political constellation. 
Even if the logic of state action had been undermined during the messy 
process of implementing the decentralisation reforms, the role of the state 
remained central. Within public discourse, the application of state power 
still needed to be legitimated through the law. Yet at this time the legal 
system was contradictory. Consequently, state agencies at different levels 
relied on different areas of law within an inconsistent, rapidly changing 
legal framework. So legality was first a matter of interpretation and 
perspective, which (as ever) was shaped for personal and institutional ends. 
The meaning of a law was coloured by shifting and contested 
interpretations of state regulations between competing agencies.  
Beyond the question of legal interpretation, a state agency—such as a 
district government, the Ministry of Forestry, or the police—needed to 
impose its interpretation in the field. A law could be used—through the 
threat or application of legal powers by a state law enforcement agency—to 
extract payments, force an accommodation, render an operation 
uneconomical, or  shut it down altogether. This depended on who had the 
authority or capacity to issue, obtain or manipulate documents, and who 
had the will or ability to enforce regulations at a particular time, for what 
reason and how they chose to do this. These applications of power in the 
field effectively regulated actors’ capacity to extract resources from the 
system. By using this power, state actors in various ways controlled other 
actors’ access to market, to various degrees accumulating revenue and 
enriching themselves in the process.  
The dispute between the Ministry of Forestry and districts over the 
permitting system illustrated how effective power could resolve the 
question of legal interpretation. Early in the high season of regional 
autonomy, districts advanced an interpretation of Law 22/1999 and earlier 
forestry department decisions that allowed them to issue permits and 
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timber transportation licenses. Consequently, districts set up their own 
regimes for handling timber against the policy directives of the ministry, 
and this helped facilitate a boom in district based timber businesses. While 
the ministry tried to rescind this policy after 1999, they lacked the capacity 
to impose these decisions on the ground. Only after the passing of a strong 
state regulation (PP 34/2002), combined with the emergence of a body (the 
police) with the authority, power and institutional interest to take action, 
was this dispute resolved in favour of the ministry. The dispute over legal 
precedence was resolved because the police could apply the state’s 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force in this area, specifically against 
nonconforming district administrations. And so the district timber regimes 
had to crawl back into the interstices of more centralised modes of resource 
control.  
The legitimacy or illegitimacy of the system of resource extraction in 
local terms depended on how well it distributed benefits and to whom, 
rather than how it related to any abstract notion of decentralisation or state 
legality. District administrations set up regulatory systems that creatively 
used the centrally created legal system: various local actors improvised 
within the framework provided by these rules and the way they were 
applied, gaining windfall profits. The de facto control of villages over 
surrounding territories in the field meant that, for the first time in many 
years, conglomerates and financiers had to pay those claiming customary 
rights for access to resources. Moreover, the development of a (limited) 
system that allowed local people to legally extract resources gave upriver 
actors a limited chance to market timber resources within the law. To be 
sure these benefits were unfairly distributed in villages, and the rural poor 
remained disadvantaged. Moreover, due to the personalistic, clientelist 
nature of the system, the constellation of actors benefiting shifted as legal-
administrative and political changes affected state based patrons in an 
administration under transition. Nonetheless, the allocation of permits to 
local actors combined with the de facto control of villagers over surrounding 
areas to strengthen the bargaining position of villagers, contributing to a 
wider sharing of benefits, and an increase in the relative value that local 
people gained from the mining of their forests. However, as elsewhere, 
decentralisation failed to establish the rights of local users in any enduring 
way; on the contrary, it only extended privileges (cf. Ribot and Peluso 
2002: 163). Consequently, with changes in state laws after 2002, 
recentralisation abolished these district regimes.  
As noted earlier, the literature on good governance accents the role of 
civil society in ‘civilising’ the state. While there are competing concepts of 
civil society drawing on Locke, Hegel, Marx and Gramsci, these traditions of 
thought all relate to the contextually specific history of the emergence of 
modernity in Western Europe (Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001). The variety of 
uses given the term in contemporary political and academic practice 
drawing on this history leads to a concept of civil society in the form of ‘a 
hydra-headed sign’ that ‘captures otherwise inchoate—as yet unnamed and 
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unnameable—popular aspirations, moral concerns, sites and spaces of 
practice’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999). These aspirations and concerns 
can converge around the idea of creating an authentic political order that 
can hold the state accountable and help it accomplish overriding common 
interests (Khilnani 2001). This provides both a normative rationale for 
embarking on decentralisation reforms and a programmatic view of what 
should happen afterwards.  
Decentralisation has reportedly helped increase the influence of grass 
root civil society groups over the local state in other contexts (Manor 1999; 
Mathew 2003). Yet, Central Kalimantan contrasts with the prescribed 
model. This remote province experienced restrictions on political 
organisation during the New Order, ethnic divisions, geographical isolation 
and the poor economic situation of Central Kalimantan’s rural communities, 
together with the localised, naked and violent expression of power in rural 
areas. Taken together, these factors seem to have affected the prospects 
for developing the type of civil society required for good governance. 
Central Kalimantan seems to lack the type and variety of associational 
forms—from cultural organisations to ethnic and other groups—that might 
fulfill the role of a functioning civil society. In particular, the place still 
requires the critical mass of organised actors who could hold district 
administrations downwardly accountable. Here the de facto institutional 
arrangements developed from exchanges within strong networks 
encompassing the district administration, legislative, and other actors who 
were somewhat autonomous of rural interest. The voice of what 
associational life existed tended to orientate itself around the expectation 
that they could participate in the distribution of benefits in one form or 
another. These factors worked against collective action to shape official 
district policy or hold district administrations accountable in ways other than 
economic distribution.  
Yet, if the concept of civil society emerged during the period of modern 
European state formation, as others have noted, in contexts such as Central 
Kalimantan, the discussion of civil society is necessarily reduced to a sorry 
analysis of lack and deficiency. Here the good governance and 
decentralisation policy approach fails to provide any expectation other than 
policy failure. It is this perception of policy failure that has legitimised the 
return to a more centralised mode of resource control since 2002.  
However, just as with western forms of modernisation, there is little 
reason why western models of civil society should be universal. Other forms 
of political society are possible; other societies can develop their own forms 
of non governmental organisation and association (Comaroff and Comaroff 
1999; Kaviraj 2001). Here the voice of Central Kalimantan’s political society 
focused on participating in the clientelist system for distributing benefits 
rather than participating in the core policy-setting functions of government. 
Viewed from this angle, decentralisation in Central Kalimantan increased 
the bargaining position of a diverse group of actors. Given the pressure 
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brought to bear against those extracting resources locally under regional 
autonomy, this voice seems to have led to a wider distribution of resources 
in the local domain compared to when actors in far off Jakarta had more 
control over resource access. To avoid the blind ally that a narrowly 
conceived decentralisation intervention suggests, attention could first be 
paid to understanding the logic of existing systems. A more modest 
approach here would begin with how actual systems work, considering how 
to improve the bargaining position of marginal actors and increase the 
possibility of collective action within networks of exchange and 
accommodation and the wider political economy. This might provide more 
realistic expectations about the possibilities for change, and what is 
required to ameliorate the conditions of the rural poor. 
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